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Patients’ accounts of memory lapses in interactions between neurologists 
and patients with functional memory disorders. 
 
Abstract 
One of the most commonly made diagnoses in secondary care memory services is functional 
memory disorder (FMD). FMD is non-progressive and characterised by persistent worries 
about memory failures without objective evidence of cognitive impairment. This study 
explores how patients with FMD present their memory concerns. Utilizing video recordings 
of consultations between patients and neurologists in a memory clinic, we show that FMD 
patients account for their memory deficits as significant disruptions to their daily lives. 
Resonating with research which identified a dissonance between self-reports of memory 
functioning by FMD patients and the outcome of neuropsychological assessments, we 
demonstrate that, in giving a detailed account of their perceived memory problems, patients 
provide objective conversational evidence of their cognitive and memory capacity, implicitly 
undermining the claim of an objective problem. Using conversation analysis, we examine 
three of the more prominent interactional practices FMD patients draw on when attempting to 
communicate memory deficits to the doctor – they are (i) contrasts with a standard of 
‘normal’; (ii) third-party observations; and (iii) direct reported speech. These interactional 
features are recurrent devices for displaying memory concerns as legitimate problems, 
embedded within patients’ accounts of their day-to-day lives. 
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Introduction 
When patients in the UK have memory concerns, they might talk to their general practitioner 
(GP) who could refer them on to a specialist service such as a memory clinic for further 
testing and possible diagnosis. Most patients attending memory clinics fall into one of a 
modest number of broad diagnostic categories. Typically, cognitive problems are caused by 
one of several different progressive neurological disorders (ND) associated with functional 
and structural brain changes. However, in memory clinics for younger patients, up to 50% of 
patients will ultimately be diagnosed with a functional memory disorder (FMD). FMD is a 
condition in which subjective memory complaints are not associated with any identifiable 
anatomical or physiological abnormalities of the brain, and are not expected to progress 
(Blackburn et al. 2014; Schmidtke, Pohlmann, and Metternich 2008). Dementia is diagnosed 
when cognitive impairment is sufficiently severe to affect a person’s normal level of 
functioning (the commonest causes of dementia due to ND are Alzheimer’s Disease (AD), 
but also Cortical Lewy-Body Disease, cerebrovascular dementia or frontotemporal dementia). 
When cognitive impairment is less severe, but thought likely to progress to dementia due to 
ND, patients may be labelled as having mild cognitive impairment (MCI) (Petersen 2005).  
 Patients with FMD complain about memory failures. However, unlike patients with 
dementia or MCI, their performance in objective tests of memory and attention do not differ 
from healthy controls (Wakefield et al. 2017). FMD is a cognitive presentation of Functional 
Neurological Symptom (Conversion) Disorder. The latest version of the Diagnostic Statistical 
Manual (DSM-5) describes this disorder as characterised by symptoms or deficits not better 
explained by another medical or mental disorder. Yet, the DSM-5 also states that FMD 
causes clinically significant patient distress or impairment in areas of social, occupational, or 
other important functioning, warranting medical evaluation. The DSM-5 (as with the 
previous DSM-IV-TR) clearly distinguishes these disorders from scenarios in which 
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symptoms are feigned or consciously produced. The most widely adopted diagnostic criteria 
for FMD are proposed by Schmidtke and colleagues, who characterise patients as having “an 
acquired medical and psychological condition with significant failure of memory and 
concentration that occurs in daily living, is unrelated to organic factors, and is assumed to be 
caused by distress and psychological dysfunction” (Schmidtke, Pohlmann, and Metternich 
2008 p. 982). This definition specifically excludes those who experience cognitive problems 
in the context of depression (a scenario sometimes labelled as “depressive pseudo-dementia”) 
(Kiloh 1961). 
In recent years there has been a marked increase in GP visits, and referrals to 
specialist services, due in part to Government initiatives such as the National Dementia 
Strategy (NDS) – a scheme that promotes the benefits of visiting specialist services to 
identify care needs, provides access to medication capable of ameliorating some of the 
symptoms of dementia temporarily, and assists in helping to moderate the loss of patients’ 
quality of life (Blackburn et al. 2014). Previous research using conversation analysis (CA) in 
memory clinic encounters has identified several important differences between the ways in 
which patients with ND, and patients with FMD, communicate with doctors in the memory 
clinic. For example, when asked who is most worried about their memory, FMD patients 
commonly report themselves as having the concern. In comparison, patients with ND tend to 
state that others, such as family members, are most worried. FMD patients also tend to give 
fuller, more detailed accounts of particular memory lapses, whereas people with ND are often 
unable to think of a specific examples of cognitive failures, or only described their memory 
problems in vague terms (Elsey et al. 2015; Jones et al. 2015; Reuber et al. 2018). 
Paradoxically then, it is those patients that tend to display less concern in how they account 
for their memory problems, who are more likely to develop (and receive a diagnosis of) ND. 
In contrast, those patients who typically display most concern are more often diagnosed with 
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(non-progressive) FMD. Consequently, there is a dissonance between FMD patients’ self-
reports and the outcome of the medical assessment.  
By analysing how patients with FMD characterise and maintain their accounts of 
memory failures, this article focuses on the practices FMD patients use to describe memory 
loss, as they attempt to convince the doctor of their problem, and the severity. What do 
patients report as significant for them when they first describe their memory concerns to  
neurologists, and how do they display these features interactionally? The identification of 
commonly formulated features across cases will not only give a greater understanding of how 
FMD is experienced and characterised, but may assist healthcare professionals identifying 
FMD at an earlier stage in the diagnostic process. Early FMD diagnosis also enables 
provision of appropriate treatment, including education about ‘normal’ memory lapses and 
reassurance about the likely absence of brain pathology. This aspect of the present study is 
part of an on-going programme of research designed to explore whether patients’ 
communication behaviour in their interactions with experts in the memory clinic can help 
with the clinical differentiation between ND and FMD (Elsey et al. 2015; Jones et al. 2015; 
Mirheidari, Blackburn, Walker, Reuber, and Christensen 2017). 
However, this study will also explore another issue. Whilst the memory problems of 
patients with ND correlate with objective abnormalities on examination or investigation, and 
may therefore be considered ‘medically explained’, and whilst patients with depression have 
a widely accepted psychiatric condition providing a medically valid explanation for their 
memory problems, the subjective memory concerns of patients with FMD remain ‘medically 
unexplained’. The present study is motivated by the question of how patients with FMD 
characterise memory failures that may not be ‘medically explained’. In contrast to patients 
with other types of memory loss, those with FMD typically report subjective concerns about 
every day or ‘normal’ forgetting. However, for FMD patients to convince neurologists that 
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their problems are medically significant, they face the challenge of presenting their cognitive 
deficiencies as exceptional and medically distinct from normal performance fluctuations, 
through the interactional resources available to them. And so, we investigate the ways in 
which patients build their case for aid in these consultations, as “worthy of medical attention, 
worthy of evaluation as a potentially significant medical condition, worthy of counselling 
and, where necessary, medical treatment” – essentially, as ‘doctorable’ (Heritage and 
Robinson 2006 p. 58). Thus, our task in this article is to examine how FMD patients account 
for their memory concerns by presenting them as 'non-typical' memory lapses. 
 
Data and method 
Data and ethical considerations 
The data consists of seventeen video recordings of initial consultations between neurologists 
and patients who had been referred by their GP to a neurology-led memory clinic, and 
ultimately received diagnoses of FMD (see Reuber et al. 2018). Data were recorded at the 
Royal Hallamshire Hospital, Sheffield as part of ongoing research study, aiming to identify 
interactional features capable of helping with the differential diagnosis of FMD and ND 
(Elsey et al. 2015; Jones et al. 2015). Routine outpatient encounters were captured in a young 
onset dementia service, and involved interactions between patients and three consultant 
neurologists, as well as different neurology trainees. The recordings were transcribed in line 
with the conventions used in conversation analysis (CA), enabling detailed analysis of 
interactions (Jefferson 2004a). This study was approved by the NHS Research Ethics 
Committee (NRES Committee Yorkshire and The Humber - South Yorkshire).  
 All participants received written information about the study at least 48 hours prior to 
their appointment and were encouraged to discuss the information with their companions for 
the clinic visit. Prior to their appointment on the day of the visit, participants had the 
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opportunity to speak to a member of the research team. Participants gave written informed 
consent, having been told that they could withdraw from the study at any time. Patients who 
lacked capacity (i.e., were not deemed able to make informed decision about study 
participation themselves) were not recruited into the study. Confidentiality was assured, and 
any identifying information (e.g., participants’ names and addresses) in transcripts and other 
materials was pseudo-anonymized. A clinical diagnosis of FMD was achieved through a 
multidisciplinary assessment process, including history taking, a standardised general 
cognitive screen (the Addenbrooke’s Cognitive Examination or ACE), followed by detailed 
neuropsychological examination and an MRI scan (Elsey et al. 2015; Reuber et al. 2018). In 
keeping with the diagnostic criteria for FMD proposed by Schmidtke et al. (2008), patients 
thought to have ‘active depression’ were excluded from the FMD group. Active depression 
was either diagnosed by neurologists based on face-to-face assessments, or suspected in 
patients scoring >15 on the depression screening scale (PHQ9).1 
 
Method 
We use conversation analysis (CA) to examine the data, which typically approaches the study 
of talk by focusing on action, turn design, and how one speaker’s turn builds on that of 
another (Sacks 1992; Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson 1974). CA is increasingly used in the 
study of medical interaction (e.g., Drew, Chatwin, and Collins 2001; Heritage, Elliott, 
Stivers, Richardson, and Mangione-Smith 2010; Maynard and Heritage 2005; Stivers et al. 
2017). The present study focuses on features of interaction that are formulated within 
accounts of patient experience (Drew 2006). We investigate the ways in which patients 
characterise their lapses, and how these descriptions are accountable as memory problems. 
Our primary analytic concern is not what patients may or may not forget, but the ways in 
                                                          
1 See Reuber et al. (2018) for more information on patient selection. 
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which these accounts of memory loss are formulated as problems, in the context of patient-
neurologist encounters. All patients bar one reported here (034) were alone during the 
consultation. Consultations approximately lasted one hour. During typical consultations, 
neurologists move through the initial history-taking phase, in which a range of open ‘Wh’ 
questions are asked (e.g., ‘how can I help?’, ‘what problems have you been experiencing?’ or 
‘why have you come?’), before progressing to a standardised general cognitive screen (ACE). 
The focus of this analysis in on the opening phase, where patients are given the interactional 
space to describe their experiences of memory loss. In the analysis below, we show three 
interactional practices that patients commonly use when accounting for their memory 
problems. 
 
Analysis 
When patients attempt to convey the seriousness of their memory lapses, they sometimes 
volunteer accounts of their experiences. Alternatively, they are prompted by neurologists’ 
questions, illustrated by the following commonly designed prompts. 
 
1. Formulation and follow-up  
01  Neu:   Mcht .hh u:m (.) And you’ve given me a few 
02         examples there um (0.5) with >tryin’ t’ f’get< 
03         people’s names remember my name, 
04         (0.4) 
05  Neu:   Um are there any other examples you can give  
06         me, 
 
2. Upshot  
01  Neu:   Mcht .hHH And e- so how is- this impacting yer 
02         job. 
 
3. New topic  
01  Neu:   Can ↑you tell me (.) what problems you’ve been 
02         having (.) with your memory and what your 
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03         expectations are from clinic today. 
 
Patients respond by describing memory experiences from their day-to-day lives – but do so in 
ways that demonstrate they have a problem, so that aid may be offered. In this way, patients 
characterise their talk to be accountable as memory deficiencies they are experiencing, 
whereby there are ‘interactional consequences’ – essentially, their concerns are designed to 
be understood as legitimate anxieties by neurologists (see Haugh 2013). We analyse three of 
the more prominent interactional practices that FMD patients draw on when characterising 
everyday events to communicate their memory deficits: contrasts with a standard of ‘normal’, 
third-party observations, and direct reported speech. 
 
1. Contrasts with a standard of ‘normal’ 
When FMD patients account for their memory lapses, they often demonstrate their 
shortcomings by comparing their memory to a benchmark they consider ‘normal’. When 
describing someone or something as odd or irregular, very often it is not enough only to 
describe a particular action as peculiar - the abnormal action is explicitly constructed in 
contrast to what is routine and normal (Smith 1978). In designing talk this way, actions can 
be treated as accountable – representations of the world can be formulated as usual, normal 
or regular, in contrast to what is unusual, abnormal and irregular, in terms of disrupting life’s 
‘ordinariness’ (Sacks 1984). The following examples illustrate how patients distinguish their 
memory loss from characterisations which they display as ‘normal’.  
 In Extract 1, the patient’s partner is represented as having a normal memory, 
contrasted to his own. This example begins at the start of the consultation and begins with the 
patient giving an account of his memory concern.  
 
Extract 1: 011a 
01  Neu:   >So I’m< Doctor Johnson.=I’m the (0.7) registrar   
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02         in neurology, (0.3) >d’you wanna< tell me: (0.9) 
03         um why you’ve come today and what expectations 
04         you have about the clinic. 
05  Pat1:  .hh ↑Well Hh one of the reasons was because uh I  
06         have a partner (0.8) a:nd he was sorta  
07         reminiscing about (0.4) times past li- holidays 
08         and things we’ve had >an I< thought (.) .hh ↑wl I  
09         can’t remember that, ‘n (.) °I can’t° remember that 
10         happening, 
 
This first example demonstrates how the patient (P1) presents his memory concern “>an I< 
thought (.) .hh ↑wl I can’t remember that, ‘n (.) °I can’t° remember that happening,” (lines 8-
10) to the neurologist (N) in contrast to his partner’s normal memory “he was sorta 
reminiscing about (0.4) times past li- holidays and things we’ve had” (lines 6-8). As mutual 
experiences, both P1 and his partner have equal epistemic access to these events as shared 
memories (Heritage 2012). However, P1 exhibits that he has a concern by presenting his 
partner’s memory ability as the standard – essentially, displaying the partner’s reminiscing as 
a normal, regular activity contrasted to P1’s inability to reminisce because a past event has 
been forgotten. Note also the turn-initial “↑Well” (line 5), which indicates to N that the 
following account may be an “extended narrative” of the problem (Heritage 2015 p. 92) – a 
point underpinned by “one”, projecting that more reasons for the call are to follow.  
 In Extract 2, the comparative device represented as the norm is the patient’s past 
ability relating to daily tasks.  
 
Extract 2: 072 
01  Neu:   Can ↑you tell me (.) what problems you’ve been 
02         having (.) with your memory and what your 
03         expectations are from clinic today. 
           ((Attendance details omitted for brevity)) 
04  Pat2:  .hhh u:m (0.3) mcht .hh becau:se #uh uh# something 
05         quite shocking had happened to me I’d- mb <been a  
06         great traveller .hh in my life and I love  
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07         travelling. 
08         (.) 
09  Pat2:  .hH A:nd I’d booked to see a friend in Germany, 
10         .hh a:nd got to the airport’nd was going to  
11         collect my ticket at the desk- .HH (.) an I’d  
12         booked for the wrong day.  
13         (0.8) 
14  Pat2:  °I’d booked the ticket for the wrong day.° 
 
The first contrastive element of P2’s response is demonstrated with “I’d- mb <been a great 
<traveller .hh in my life” (lines 5-6). By presenting herself as an experienced traveller, P2 
characterises someone familiar with the practicalities of organising transport, getting to 
destinations and such like – essentially, the normal tasks that experienced travellers 
undertake. P2 then presents the everyday activities done as a traveller, such as booking the 
flight and going to airport (lines 9-10). The second contrastive element is described (lines 10-
12). P2’s displayed awareness that she made an error booking travel tickets is thus the 
irregular contrast to the normal standard of what she expectantly does as a competent 
traveller – booking tickets for the correct day of travel. This type of X/Y contrastive device -
“At first I thought X” (the mundane thing) “when I realised Y” (the extraordinary thing) - is 
often used in marking out both the normalness of one activity in order to account for 
something else as irregular (Jefferson 2004b). 
 The next example highlights how a past/present contrastive device is used by a patient 
when attempting to convey his memory as a concern. 
 
Extract 3: 054 
01  Neu:   So (0.5) mcht thanks f’coming in today, (.) >an I  
02         think< my first question to you is (.) um to say 
03         .hh what problems have you notice of any with  
04         your memory an’ what your expectations of coming 
05         (.) to this clinic. 
06  Pat3:  Mcht .hh ahm (1.5) .h I- I s:: (0.4) >(I mean)<  
07         I’ve I’ve gone from sort’ve .h probably a year ago 
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08         (to) havin a (.) .hh a really good IQ. 
09         (0.7) 
10  Pat3:  To: (0.2) n:ot being able to remember (.) the 
11         simplest of things now. 
12         (.) 
13  Pat3:  .Hh (.) It’s (.) mainly names that I can’t (0.2)   
14         can’t get my head around 
15         (0.4) 
16  Pat3:  .Hh: Not names of people but names of: like  
17         plants an’ things. 
 
Extract 3 illustrates how points in time are used as a resource when accounting for a memory 
lapse. First, P3 demonstrates his previously good memory ability (lines 7-8). Note the 
rhetorically emphasised “really good IQ” which appears inversely contrasted to the second 
element “n:ot being able to remember (.) the simplest of things now.” (lines 10-11), 
underlined with “simplest”. Thus, P3’s current inability to remember what is cognitively 
undemanding is in many ways an extreme opposite of the past really good IQ. Further, there 
is a spatial aspect to this account which appears reminiscent of work on metaphorical 
expression (Drew 2006). The metaphorically conceptualised term “I’ve gone from” prefaces 
the contrast between past (having a really good IQ) and present (not being able to remember 
the simplest of things). Thus, metaphors can be resources for displaying concepts which may 
be problematic to communicate, in ways which can be understood by recipients (Lakoff and 
Johnson 1980). 
 A significant point to note about the examples in this section, is that patients’ 
descriptions of their memory problems are not presented in isolation. In recalling past events, 
patients frame their memory deficits within a range of everyday activities, relationships, and 
experiences. By using contrastive formulations such as these, patients demonstrate what is 
regular or normal day-to-day life, compared to what is irregular or abnormal. And so, 
memory problems are depicted as clear deviations from normal everyday experience, 
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demonstrating that past recollections of memory loss are designed to be treated as credible by 
neurologists. 
 
2. Third-party observations 
Another practice drawn on by patients to demonstrate they have a memory concern is to 
report comments about their memory made by third-parties. In characterising their memory 
as deficient, patients observably measure their difficulties against some normal or normative 
judgement by others. While not present in these consultations, the inclusion of a third party 
(forming a triadic ‘three-person association’) in the presentation of memory concerns may 
have consequences for the interaction where previously a dyadic (two person) association 
operated (Simmel 1950). By working to justify their reason for visiting, patients are tasked 
with presenting their medical problems as ‘doctorable’, in the sense that their concerns are 
valid (Heritage and Robinson 2006). In this way, a third-party observation (TPO) may 
present a more compelling case, in terms of supporting patients’ memory concerns as 
legitimate medical issues. 
 The first example in this section demonstrates how family remarks are presented by 
patients in accounting for their memory as problematic. 
 
Extract 4: 001 
 
01  Neu:   An:d uh (.) can you tell me a bit more about that? 
           ((Attendance details omitted for brevity)) 
02  Pat4:  U:m (1.0) it’s more noticeable uh:m (0.6) >wl=it’s< 
03         noticeable every day, .hH an:d but it’s um: (0.9) 
04         mcht (.) family. 
05         (0.3) 
06  Pat4:  In fact when family ‘ave sort of (0.3) <commented. 
07         (0.5) 
08  Pat4:  °Um° at first it was >a bit of a< (.) a joke.   
09         (0.5) 
10  Pat4:  Uh:m (1.0) but (1.1) I think it’s really because of 
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11         the amount of information I have to (0.4) 
12         retain. 
13         (2.7) 
14  Neu:   >Sh’you have to <retain lots of (0.3) [information. 
15  Pat4:                                        [Yeah.  
 
Extract 4 begins with a follow-up question from N (the first being “how can I help?”), in 
response to P4 indicating she is here for her memory appointment. After reporting frequent 
‘noticings’ (lines 1-2) (Schegloff 1998), P4 describes the TPO with “In fact when family ’ave 
sort of (0.3) <commented.” (line 6). The design of this reported observation is notable in that 
by operationalising ‘fact’, the TPO displays something difficult to counter. Yet, the hedged 
‘sort of’ and informal ‘commented’ appear to reduce the rhetorical impact of the TPO - the 
implication being that P4’s report is authentic and the TPO was said in passing rather than 
raised as a specific memory concern. Indeed, “°um° at first it was >a bit of a< (.) a joke.” 
(line 8) seemingly goes further in characterising a casual, unproblematic TPO. However, P4’s 
subsequent turn (lines 10-12) marks out the prior TPO as objectively noticeable, by the way 
in which jokiness is contrasted to things C has to remember. Further, referencing the 
jocularity of others in the form ‘at first’, implies a change since then, and thus, is significant 
for showing the ‘noticings’ of others as a serious memory concern for P4 – as one that has 
developed over time. In this way, P4 can be seen as characterising prior observations of 
others in contrast with her present reality.  
 The next extract illustrates how a social engagement with friends is drawn on when 
constructing memory as a concern. 
 
Extract 5: 045 
01  Pat5:  .hH U:m(.) <and coz the boys if w’go out out for 
02         a beer. 
03         (.) 
04  Pat5:  .hh I can go to the bar an’ come back with  
05         something (0.2) completely different to what 
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06         somebody asked for. 
07         (.) 
08  Pat5:  .h uh >Because I< mixed the drink up. 
09         (.) 
10  Pat5:  .hh An:d it gets to the point where (.) people do 
11         actually ‘ave pass comments (.) <Jokingly. 
12         (.) 
13  Pat5:  .hh that um I’ve made a mistake “don’t ask him to 
14         do that he’ll forget it.” 
15         (.) 
16  Pat5:  .hh Mcht .h (.) An they all laugh.  
17         (0.4) 
18  Pat5:  But t’me: (.) I cover it.  
19         (0.5) 
20  Neu:   Y[eah. 
21  Pat5:   [I-  it hurts. 
 
Extract 5 starts just after the start of an account, in response to N’s opening question - “What 
problems you’ve been having with your memory and what expectations you have from 
coming to the clinic today?” P5 presents his memory problem (lines 4-6), characterised as a 
general occurrence by the modal ‘can’ (Edwards 2006). Notable also is the extreme case 
formulation (ECF) ‘completely’- a practice sometimes used to defend against some state-of-
affairs being countered or challenged when making a claim (Edwards 2000; Pomerantz 
1986). The TPO is then reported with “.hh an:d it gets to the point where (.) people do 
actually ‘ave pass comments (.) <Jokingly.” (lines 10-11). As with the previous extract, a 
spatial metaphor is used (here, with “gets to the point”) - again, as a way of indicating that 
things have got worse over time (Drew 2006). Further, by reporting that his friends comment 
“Jokingly.” (line 11) and “they all laugh” (line 16), P5 observably characterises the TPO as 
something amusing to his friends, contrasted to his own reported feelings on the matter (“I 
cover it” at line 18 and “it hurts” at line 21). Contrasting his feelings to the TPO allows P5 to 
project an emotional state as authentic in the face of potential humiliation by others. Emotion 
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metaphors such as ‘I cover it’ and ‘it hurts’ can be specifically selected to perform particular 
functions in talk, such as displaying P5’s memory loss as a genuine problem (Edwards 1997).  
 The next example shows how work colleagues’ observations are formulated when 
patients characterise their memory as deficient. 
 
Extract 6: 010 
 
01  Pat6:  <I think people have noticed at wor- an y- when  
02         I were fir:st .HH (.) °bad with ma memory° .HH i- 
03         people used to laugh at me >it used to be a bit 
04         of a< jo(h)ke <julie’s ng said summut wrong again  
05         yer know. 
06         (.) 
07  Pat6:  .hHH u:m(.) But now it’s irritating and no:w .HH  
08         I think people (0.3) well (I know) this °managers  
09         s:lagged me off behind me back to all of the  
10         tea:m that I work in,°  
11         (.) 
12  Pat6:  .HH <And it’s made an effect thut (.) .hh they treat  
13         me differently now.  
 
Extract 6 begins just after the start of the patient’s account, in response to N’s initiating 
question “who’s more concerned about your memory, is it yourself or family and friends?” 
P6 reports the TPO “<I think people have noticed at wor-“ (line 1), although hedged with ‘I 
think’. An account of this noticing is provided (lines 2-4). As with the two prior extracts, note 
how P6 invokes a previous point in time by using a spatial metaphor – in this case, when she 
was first bad with her memory. By describing her problem in this way, P6 observably marks 
out her concern as one that has endured over of period of time – thereby, projecting her 
problem as something ‘doctorable’, and thus worthy of medical attention (Heritage and 
Robinson 2006). As with previous examples in this section, others are reported making 
jocular observations – people laugh, it’s ‘a bit of a joke’. Note the contrastive elements of 
P6’s account, as she reports how others view her memory problems, compared with her 
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emotional reality with “but now. it’s irritating” (line 7), in which the present ‘now’ is neatly 
embedded and emphasised in contrast to the prior “I were fir:st” (line 2). 
Aside from the recurrent use of spatial metaphors, an important point to make about 
the extracts in this section is the jocularity assigned to others’ observations. Considered in 
psychological terms, humour has been regarded as a means of allaying anxiety in others 
(Freud 1950), or something interactionally designed through the reinterpretation of personal 
experience, into an event that can be mutually shared (Coser 1959). In everyday discourse, 
laughter commonly indicates mutual displays of alignment, such as laughing together at a 
joke (Glenn and Holt 2013; Jefferson 1979). However, in the examples above, laughter or 
jokiness is not reportedly shared by patients, implying that patients are potentially being 
laughed at, rather than with.2 However, our focus here is how laughter and jocularity in these 
accounts are produced in talk (Clift 2013) – for instance, illustrating how TPOs are designed 
as a generalised phenomenon (‘they’, ‘people’, and ‘family’). Significantly, jokiness is 
observably used as a contrastive element, set against patients’ realities. A comparison can be 
drawn with how the seriousness of complaints are objectively enhanced, with contrasts to 
jocular expression (Edwards 2005).  
 
3. Direct reported speech 
A third practice identified in the talk of FMD patients when displaying the seriousness of 
their memory lapses, is by quoting the talk of themselves and others through direct reported 
speech (DRS). In characterising what is said through DRS, provides for an authenticity in 
talk’s production, in so far as patients are doing the voice of (Clift and Holt 2006). However, 
the quotation of talk verbatim is highly improbable in the course of reporting content (Bartlett 
                                                          
2 For an examination of the social and (negative) moral functions of humour and ridicule, see Billig (2005) and 
Mulkay (1988).  
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1932; Volosinov 1971). Thus, when speakers describe speech in talk, considerations should 
be made in terms of the formulation of dialogue rather the reporting of it (Tannen 1989). 
Consequently, DRS can be utilised as a way of enhancing the rhetorical impact of some claim 
or account (Wooffitt 1992).  
 The first example in this section demonstrates how DRS in the workplace is 
characterised when reporting memory issues. 
 
Extract 7: 036 
01  Neu:   Uhm (1.2) when: hh can you give me an example >of  
02         the< last time your memory let you s- let you 
03         down. 
04         (0.5) 
05  Pat7:  Mcht .hhh (0.3) #I m- u:m# hh I was on the 
06         telephone (0.6) mcht makin an appointment   
07         f’someone at wor:k. 
08         (.)  
09  Pat7:  .hh And we’d send appointment cards out to ‘em. 
10         (.) 
11  Pat7:  .hh And I’d picked the appointment card up  
12         <n a said to the (.) customer .hh “right I will 
13         send you (.) a,”  
14         (.) 
15  Pat7:  .hh (.) An I couldn’t think.  
16         (0.8) 
17  Pat7:  Of the word appointment car(h)d. 
 
In this example, P7 reports an incident at work relating to arranging a customer appointment 
(lines 5-7). After a brief clarification of the appointment card’s function (line 9), P7 continues 
with “and I’d picked the appointment card up” (line 11), in so doing indexing the significance 
of the card within the telling of the DRS “<n a said to the (.) customer .hh “right I will send 
you (.) a”” (lines 12-13). A common feature in the corpus is how the DRS is prefaced – here 
with ‘and I said’. This introductory component of P7’s account acts to frame the reported talk 
by a proceeding speech verb plus a name or a pronoun. Prefaces play a central role in how 
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reported speech is ‘footed’ as a recognisable device for recipients in separating what is 
reported from what is not (Holt 2006). The DRS itself reports the memory lapse as 
experienced by P7, as what has been omitted is the component reportedly forgotten. Note 
how the designedly incomplete turn is abandoned after the emphasised ‘a’, marking out the 
turn’s deficiency (see Stokoe 2010) . P7’s “.hh (.) an I couldn’t think.” (line 15) attends to her 
memory concern as an event she was the recipient of – it wasn’t that she wouldn’t, but she 
couldn’t think. The increment “Of the word appointment car(h)d .HH” (line 17) neatly 
underlines what has been omitted.  
 The next case demonstrates how others’ talk is reported when patients describe 
memory lapses at social functions.  
 
Extract 8: 002 
01  Neu:   An c’n you give me: an example the last time your 
02         memory let you s- let you down. 
03  Pat8:  Mcht .hh Yeah there >was a< p↑atch kind’ve um:.  
04         (0.8) 
05  Pat8:  Mcht .hh (>It must<) be: kind of about three °or° 
06         four months ago, (0.6) I: (1.0) I missed a dinner 
07         date with some friends they’d cooked me dinner 
08         °and everything an then phoned me up g-° sayin 
09         .hh “where are you.” 
10         (0.3) 
11  Pat8:  Mcht .hh uhm: Fortune’ly they’re old friends so 
12         they und(h)st(h)ood bu-(.)t (.) that’s not good 
13         really,  
 
In Extract 8, there is an introductory component which aids the DRS footing (here, prefaced 
with the action) “an then phoned me up g-° sayin” (line 8) followed by the DRS itself “.hh 
where are you.” (line 9). Unlike the last extract, there is no single speaker whose talk is 
reported. However, in terms of framing what is reported here and in the last extract, there are 
distinct similarities. Note P8’s audible inbreathe ‘.hh’ here and in Extract 7 (line 12). As there 
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doesn’t appear to be a distinct prosodic shift in reported talk as is common in such cases 
(Couper-Kuhlen 2006), the audible inbreath could further contribute to the marking out of 
what is said and what is reported as said. P8 closes her account with “fortune’ly they’re old 
friends so they und(h)st(h)ood” (line 11-12), which indicates that although this account 
reports a single event, P8’s memory lapses may be a recurrent problem.  
 The final extract illustrates how self-talk is reported, and how work colleagues 
respond when patients report memory problems. 
 
Extract 9: 034 
01  Pat9:  #I# I ‘ave (.) >I mean a< work for m’self I have  
02         guys workin for me. 
03         (.)  
04  Pat9:  .hh And it’s quite frustrating because (0.5)  #I# 
05         I’ll say: (0.3) obviously said something to  
06         them at w- at some stage. 
07         (0.7) 
08  Pat9:  And then >when I< go out’n check what they’re 
09         doin I’ll say “why you doin that.”         
10         (0.4) 
11  Neu:   °Hm° 
12  Pat9:  >’N they say “well y-< you told us to.” 
13         (.) 
14  Pat9:  And I can’t remember sayin that.         
15         (0.4) 
16  Neu:   °Mm(hm mm)° 
 
Extract 9 starts midway through an account P9, in response to N’s “would you like to 
describe the problem now with which you are seeing me today?” P9 reports the course of 
action (lines 8-9) followed by the DRS “I’ll say “why you doin that.”” (line 9), initiated by 
the introductory component “I’ll say”. Notably, this component seems generally formulated, 
as opposed to ‘I said’ - it is something P9 will say as he is usually says it, displaying a 
dispositional stance for these types of situations (Edwards 1997). P9 describes the responsive 
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DRS (line 12), characterising the DRS in generalised terms with the component “they say”. 
Note the turn initial ‘well’, indicating something potentially non-straightforward may be 
uttered next. Further, both self and others’ talk is reported as a question directly followed by a 
response. The sequential representation of this event reflects everyday turns-at-talk in that 
first-pair part inquiries are generally followed by second-pair part responses (Schegloff 
2007). By characterising his memory concern through a responsive DRS device, P9 may be 
attempting to convey the authenticity of an interaction by reporting the completeness of it.  
A significant feature of Extract 9 relates to how the patient reports self and others’ 
talk in generalised or normative terms (‘I’ll say’ and ‘they say’). However, as DRS is 
reported verbatim, an interesting paradox is revealed. As noted earlier, it is highly unlikely 
that others’ talk is quoted accurately (Volosinov 1971). Thus, by normatively foregrounding 
DRS (that is, by indicating that forthcoming reported talk is not just reference to one 
occasion, but is generalised to multiple occasions), patients can be seen as interactionally 
enhancing the rhetorical impact of DRS. And so, it is not what patients or others may or may 
not have previously said, but how accounts of their memories are formulated as authentic 
depictions of everyday life.   
 
Discussion 
This paper describes the conversational methods that patients with FMD use when 
describing their subjective memory impairment (SMI) to specialists in a memory clinic. 
There is a considerable amount of literature on the medical significance of SMI as a 
categorical feature. For instance it has been shown that older adults with SMI are at 
increased risk of developing dementia (Jessen, Amariglio, et al. 2014). In younger adults, 
SMI was found to be more closely associated with anxiety and depression than a higher 
risk of AD (Paradise, Glozier, et al. 2011). One study specified that SMI associated with 
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‘no concern’ was not associated with an increased risk of developing AD, whereas self-
reported impairment associated with ‘concern’ predicted a higher risk of developing AD 
(Jessen, Wolfsgruber, et al. 2014). However, whereas these studies simply differentiated 
between patients on the basis of whether SMI was present or not, the present study 
focuses on how patients with SMI identify and communicate their concerns to a doctor. 
This topic has previously received less attention, especially in patients subsequently 
diagnosed with FMD.  
We have presented three interactional practices FMD patients commonly use 
when characterising their memory concerns to a doctor. These practices are observably 
designed to convince the doctor of the seriousness of their memory problem. The 
demonstration of difficulties with factual, day-to-day experiences provides objective 
evidence of patients’ subjective concerns.  First, contrasts with a standard of ‘normal’ are 
devices drawn on to demonstrate patients’ memory lapses as irregular and abnormal 
compared to a benchmark they consider regular and normal memory – whether others’ or 
their own memory. Second, patients report TPOs to emphasise their memory difficulties, 
relative to the (jocular) judgements of others. By indexing others’ observations, patients 
present a more compelling, and thus ‘doctorable’ case for aid, in terms of validating their 
own memory concerns – a point underpinned by the contrastive use of past/present spatial 
metaphors. Third, patients quote the talk of themselves and others through direct reported 
speech, allowing for the re-characterisation of past events as ‘accurate’ accounts of 
speakers’ utterances. 
 These FMD patients construct accounts in ways that sustain realities of memory loss, 
which are not reflected in their objective neuropsychological tests. This is not to say that they 
are feigning a memory problem or seeking medical attention without cause. However, there is 
a dissonance between patients’ displays of serious memory problems, and the reality that they 
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do not have any objectively demonstrable current cognitive impairment, or progressive 
degenerative condition (Pollner and McDonald-Wikler 1985; Wakefield et al. 2017). When 
talking about their memory concerns, patients depict the disruption to their daily lives, but do 
so by embedding their concerns within ordinary routines and activities – yet, troubles are 
presented as something endured or managed (Heritage and Robinson 2006). In this sense, 
there is a tension between attending to the trouble, reporting business-as-usual in these 
consultations (Jefferson 1988), and the conversational competence with which these accounts 
are delivered. FMD patients in our corpus appear attentive to the notion that their concerns 
should be described appropriately, and by depicting past events, good reasons should be 
communicated to the medical practitioner in order to validate the visit (Halkowski 2006). 
The notion that patients seek to describe their problems to doctors is not necessarily a 
surprising revelation. However, it is the ways in which memory concerns are presented as 
problematic that are significant for this and future research.3 The practices identified here 
may be beneficial to the ongoing programme designed to explore whether patients’ 
interactional profiles can impact on the clinical differentiation between degenerative and non-
degenerative memory conditions. Many, if not all, FMD patients’ accounts of their memory 
deficits could be considered as the kinds of lapses that regularly occur in the course of 
everyday life. However, patients do interactional work to represent their lapses as irregular 
and abnormal, in the face of what may be considered as usual or regular forgetting.  
The most current published version of the Diagnostic Statistical Manual (DSM-5) has 
recently changed the diagnostic criteria for the mental disorder previously labelled 
                                                          
3 However, it should be noted that in the absence of equivalent observations from ND patients commenting on 
the specificity of the observations made or on their differential diagnostic value is unwise. There are some 
features of talk about memory problems which could be sought out in future studies of interactions with ND 
patients and which may then contribute to the diagnostic process. It may be that patients with ND have a smaller 
need to objectify their memory problems. It is also likely that the form of their accounts of memory failings 
would be more consistent with the content of these accounts (the narratives may be incomplete and 
characterised by memory gaps). 
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Conversion Disorder and now also called Functional Neurological Symptom Disorder 
(FNSD). Unlike the previous edition (DSM-IV-TR), the DSM-5 does not require 
diagnosticians to identify conflicts or other stressors which could be associated with the 
symptoms. Instead, neurological criteria such as evidence of incompatibility between the 
symptom and recognised neurological or medical conditions have been given greater 
diagnostic significance. When patients with FMD attempt to 'objectify' their cognitive 
problems by providing detailed recollections of memory failings, including TPOs and DRS, 
they show the sort of inconsistency between their symptoms and objective signs of cognitive 
failings, demonstrating that they meet one of the key diagnostic criteria of FNSD/FMD. The 
nature of their accounts do not mean that their memory failings are not real or not causing 
distress, but it does make it unlikely that they have underlying neurodegenerative pathology 
causing the memory problems. 
The identification of patients’ intact communicative and cognitive competence in the 
presence of complaints about memory dysfunction is similar to the inconsistencies between 
symptoms and clinical signs which are used diagnostically and therapeutically in the context 
of other functional symptoms (Stone 2014). For instance, the Hoover test (causing an 
involuntary activation of muscles failing to carry out willed actions) is used to show patients 
how their paralysed leg can be made to work and therefore recover, potentially reducing 
patients’ fears of permanent paralysis. Similarly, clinicians may alleviate patients’ anxiety 
about incipient dementia by noticing the conversational practices described here, and feeding 
back to patients how the detail with which they are able to describe their cognitive problems 
reflects a good/normal level of cognitive functioning. This observation can be the starting 
point of a further explanation of functional symptoms.  
The observation of the typical conversational means of presenting symptoms in FMD 
may allow clinicians an earlier and more certain diagnosis of this condition. We demonstrate 
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that the accounts FMD patients give of their cognitive problems are characterised by efforts 
to present their concerns as ‘doctorable’, and thus, worthy of medical attention (Heritage and 
Robinson 2006). In the context of memory complaints, these efforts inadvertently undermine 
the patient’s interactional project, and allow the doctor to recognise that patients’ cognitive 
concerns are due to FMD, as opposed to a progressive neurodegenerative disorder.  
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